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Optimal Auction Design for Flexible Consumers
Shiva Navabi, Student Member, IEEE, Ashutosh Nayyar, Member, IEEE
Abstract—We study the problem of designing revenue-
maximizing auctions for allocating multiple goods to flexible
consumers. In our model, each consumer is interested in a subset
of goods known as its flexibility set and wants to consume one
good from this set. A consumer’s flexibility set and its utility
from consuming a good from its flexibility set are its private
information. We focus on the case of nested flexibility sets — each
consumer’s flexibility set can be one of k nested sets. We provide
several examples where such nested flexibility sets may arise.
We characterize the allocation rule for an incentive compatible,
individually rational and revenue-maximizing auction in terms
of solutions to integer programs. The corresponding payment
rule is described by an integral equation. We then leverage the
nestedness of flexibility sets to simplify the optimal auction and
provide a complete characterization of allocations and payments
in terms of simple thresholds.
Index Terms—Revenue maximization, Bayesian incentive com-
patibility, flexible demand, optimal auction.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of allocating limited resources among multiple
users arises frequently in a wide array of applications ranging
from communication networks to transportation and power
systems. In many such applications, the users are selfish
agents with private information about their preferences and
constraints. Finding a desirable allocation of resources would
typically require at least a partial knowledge of users’ private
preferences and constraints. The users, however, can behave
strategically in revealing their private information to benefit
themselves at the expense of other users and/or the owner of
the resources being allocated. Thus, the presence of strategic
users with private information creates two key challenges for
the resource allocation problem: (i) the allocation needs to be
based on the information revealed by the users; (ii) the alloca-
tion procedure must anticipate users’ strategic behavior in the
revelation of their private information. The economic theory of
mechanism design provides a framework for addressing such
resource allocation problems.
Auctions provide one of the simplest settings of a mech-
anism design problem. An auctioneer/mechanism designer
would typically ask for bids from potential customers, and
allocate resources and charge payments as a function of
the received bids. Customers with private information about
their utilities can be strategic about what bids they submit.
The auction design problem is to find suitable allocation
and payment functions, which map the customers’ bids to
allocations and payments, so that the auctioneer can achieve
some desired objective. Typically, the auctioneer’s objectives
are either maximization of its revenue or maximization of
social welfare.
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In this paper, we consider the problem of designing revenue-
maximizing auctions for multiple goods and flexible con-
sumers. Consumer flexibility about goods can arise in different
scenarios. In demand response programs of electric utilities,
some consumers may be flexible about when and at what
rate they receive power. In airline/hotel reservation settings,
customers may be flexible about their travel dates. The seller
of these goods/services should be able to take this flexibility
into account to improve its profits. In our setup, each consumer
is associated with a flexibility set that describes the subset of
goods the consumer is equally interested in. Each consumer
wants to consume one good from its flexibility set. The flexi-
bility set of a consumer and the utility it gets from consuming
a good from its flexibility set are both its private information.
We focus on the case of nested flexibility sets — each con-
sumer’s flexibility set can be one of the k sets, B1,B2, . . . ,Bk,
which are nested in the following way:
B1 ⊂ B2 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Bk. (1)
If consumers’ flexibility sets are truthfully revealed to the
auctioneer, the nestedness in (1) allows the auctioneer to com-
pare consumer flexibility and say whether a given consumer
is more, less or equally flexible as another consumer.
A. Examples of Nested Flexibility
There are several markets where consumer flexibility resem-
bles the nested pattern in (1). For example, consider flexible
electricity consumers that need one unit of energy within a
certain deadline [1]. Let Bτ denote the set of energy units
available for delivery in the interval [0, τ ], τ = 1 . . . , k.
Clearly, B1 ⊂ B2 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Bk. A consumer who needs one
unit of energy with a deadline of 2 can be seen as having
B2 as its flexibility set, that is, it needs one good from B2.
A similar flexibility model appears in auctions with deadline-
based goods such as airline ticket auctions where different
customers may have different departure deadlines.
As another example, consider electricity consumers that
need to receive a fixed amount of energy within a fixed time
interval while having certain constraints on the rate at which
they can receive energy. Suppose each consumer needs to
receive one unit of energy within the time interval [0, T ] but
some consumers need energy at a constant rate while others
can tolerate variable rates. Let B1 be the set of energy units
that the energy provider can supply at a constant rate over the
interval [0, T ] and B2 be the set of all energy units that can
be supplied over the interval [0, T ]. We thus have consumers
whose flexibility sets are either B1 or B2 with B1 ⊂ B2.
Another example of consumer flexibility comes from
auction-based spectrum allocation in cognitive radio networks
([2], [3], [4]) where a primary spectrum owner has multiple
frequency bands with different bandwidths. These bands can
2be allocated to secondary users who need a certain minimum
amount of bandwidth. Suppose the primary owner has fre-
quency bands of widths w1, w2, · · · , wk with w1 < w2 <
· · · < wk. LetWi, i = 1, 2, · · · , k, denote the set of frequency
bands of width wi that are available for allocation to secondary
users. Define Bi =
k⋃
j=k−i+1
Wj , i = 1, 2, · · · , k, as the set of
frequency bands of width greater than or equal to wk−i+1. We
thus have B1 ⊂ B2 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Bk. A secondary user that needs
one frequency band of width at least wi can be interpreted as
having Bk−i+1 as its flexibility set.
Consider next auction-based content delivery in Wireless
Information Centric Networks [5] where multiple content
providers compete for limited cache storage resources pro-
vided by a Wireless Access Point (WAP) in a given region for
a certain time period. Suppose the WAP has k cache servers
with storage capacities c1 < c2 < . . . < ck. Assume that one
cache server can serve at most one content provider at a time.
Let Bi be the set of cache servers with capacity greater than or
equal to ck−i+1. Clearly the sets Bi, i = 1, . . . , k, are nested.
A content provider who needs a cache of storage capacity at
least ck−i+1 has the flexibility set Bi.
B. Comparison with Prior Literature
The problem of designing auctions has been investigated
under many different setups in the prior literature and can be
broadly categorized on the basis of (a) the problem objective
(revenue or social welfare maximization), (b) the nature of
supply (single unit or multiple units, identical or non-identical
goods), (c) the nature of demand (unit demand, demand for
bundles, etc), and (d) the nature of private information (one-
dimensional or multi-dimensional).
Numerous works have addressed social welfare maximizing
or efficient auctions, the most well-known of these being
the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [6], [7], [8].
Efficient auctions have also been extensively studied in the
context of combinatorial auctions ([9], [10, Chapter 8], [11,
Chapter 11]). Under some scenarios the problem of exactly
maximizing social welfare may not be tractable. Some works
such as [12] and [13] have thus focused on approximate
social welfare maximizing auctions. Our focus in this paper,
however, is on revenue-maximizing auctions. In the context of
revenue-maximizing auctions, we can categorize the relevant
literature as follows:
1. Multi-unit auctions with identical goods: This strand
of literature has focused on revenue-maximizing auctions in
settings where the seller has a number of identical goods and
wants to allocate them among several consumers who may
demand one or multiple units. In his seminal paper [14], My-
erson derived fundamental results for the single-unit revenue
maximizing auction. In sequel, several works studied revenue-
maximizing multi-unit auctions with identical goods under
various assumptions about the consumers’ utility functional
forms and private information structure. The setups in [15]
and [16], for instance, include the problem of auctioning
multiple identical goods among consumers with unit demand
and private valuations. [17] considered the auction of multiple
identical goods to consumers with limited capacities for the
number of goods they can consume.
A key feature of these models is that all goods are perceived
to be identical by all consumers. Thus, consumers care only
about the number of goods they receive and not about the
identities of the goods received. In contrast, consumers in
our model differentiate between goods according to their
flexibility sets. For example, a consumer with flexibility set B1
differentiates between goods in B1 (which give it a positive
utility) and goods not in B1 (which give no utility) whereas
a consumer with a different flexibility set would view goods
differently. In other words, the distinction between goods is
made subjectively by each consumer based on its flexibility
set.
2. Combinatorial Auctions: The problem of designing
revenue-maximizing auctions has also been investigated
in the context of combinatorial auctions [18, Section 5.2].
When the seller has multiple heterogeneous items to auction,
consumers may have different utilities for different subsets
of items due to complementarities and substitution effects.
Combinatorial auctions provide a framework where consumers
can place bids on various combinations/bundles of goods.
Some key setups explored under this umbrella are:
2.1 Auctions with two non-identical goods: Armstrong
[19] studied revenue-maximizing auction for the case where
the seller wants to sell two non-identical goods to several
consumers. Each consumer can receive one or both of the
goods and has a pair of valuations, one for each of the
two goods. The valuations are drawn from binary sets and
are independent across the consumers. Avery et al. [20]
considered a similar setup as in Armstrong [19] with a single
identifiable consumer who may wish to buy both objects
and a number of other consumers who wish to buy only
one or the other of the two objects. Two key features that
differentiate these setups from our model are: (a) in both
these setups, one or more consumers can consume more than
one good whereas in our model each consumer can consume
at most one good, (b) the number of goods in our model is
not restricted to be two.
2.2 Auctions with single-minded consumers: Some recent
works have considered an extreme case of complementarity
among goods in multi-unit auctions by imposing the assump-
tion of having single-minded consumers. A single-minded
consumer is interested in getting all goods from a certain
subset of goods. This is in clear contrast to our setup where
each consumer wants to get one good from its flexibility set.
Ledyard [21] characterized a revenue-maximizing dominant
strategy auction for single-minded consumers where each
consumer’s desired bundle is known to the seller and a
consumer’s valuation constitutes its one-dimensional private
information. Unlike the model in [21], both valuation and
flexibility set are a consumer’s private information in our
model. Abhishek and Hajek [22] considered optimal auction
design for single-minded consumers with each user’s preferred
bundle as well as its valuation being its private information.
3The single-minded nature of the consumers differentiates this
work from our flexible consumer model.
2.3 Auctions with one-dimensional private information:
[23] surveys revenue-optimal auctions in various settings
where each consumer’s private information comprises only its
valuation and is assumed to be one-dimensional. [24] studied
an optimal auction design problem for two non-identical goods
where each consumer’s valuation function is parametrized by
a single quantity that represents its one-dimensional private
information. Consumers’ private information in our model,
however, is two-dimensional, consisting of both valuation and
flexibility set.
2.4 A general combinatorial auction: [18, Section 5.2] con-
sidered a general setup where the seller has multiple distinct
goods and each consumer has a value function that describes
its valuation for each bundle of goods. For each allocation
rule, [18] provides an optimization problem (in fact, a linear
program) whose solution (if it exists) gives a payment rule
that satisfies incentive compatibility and individual rationality
constraints. Eventually, after linear programs corresponding
to all possible choices of the allocation rule are solved, the
allocation and payment rules that yield the highest revenue are
declared as the revenue-maximizing mechanism. As pointed
out in [18, Section 5.2], this approach is computationally very
demanding because the number of possible allocation rules
can be very large and no closed-form solutions are available
in general.
Our model can be seen as a special case of the general
framework of [18]. A consumer with flexibility set Bi and
valuation α can be viewed as having a value function of the
form:
vi(S) =
{
α if S ∩ Bi 6= ∅ and |S| = 1
0 otherwise
. (2)
In section V, we show that under the assumption of nested
flexibility sets, we can find the optimal auction in a much more
straightforward and computationally simpler way than the one
described in [18]. In particular, unlike the case in [18, Section
5.2], we do not need to solve a separate optimization problem
for every possible allocation rule which results in a significant
reduction in the computational cost. It should also be noted
that a consumer’s private information (its value function) in
[18] is drawn from a finite set whereas the valuation in our
model is a continuous variable.
Remark 1. Consumers in our model want one good from their
flexibility sets. This model can be viewed as a special case of
the models in [25] and [26] where a number of (potentially
non-identical) goods are to be allocated among several con-
sumers and each consumer is interested in receiving at most
one good. Unlike our objective of revenue-maximization, the
objective in [25] and [26] is to find minimal competitive prices
and equilibrium assignments to clear the market.
Remark 2. The model and results in [1] are fundamentally
different from those in our paper. In particular, [1] deals
with a continuum of consumers. This is crucial because it
implies that a single consumer cannot influence the “aggregate
demand bundle” (as defined in [1]) and hence the prices. This
is in stark contrast to our paper (and most auction design
problems) with finitely many consumers where each consumer
can influence the prices through its reports/bids. This means
that each individual consumer can strategically manipulate
its report to influence allocation and prices in our problem
whereas it has no effect on prices in [1]. This, we believe,
makes our paper conceptually very different from [1].
C. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we discuss
the problem formulation and the mechanism setup in Section
II. In Section III, we characterize incentive compatibility
and individual rationality constraints for the mechanism. We
show that the optimal allocation is the solution to an integer
program in Section IV. In Section V, we simplify the optimal
allocation and payments and characterize them in terms of
simple thresholds. We summarize our findings and briefly
point out potential extensions to the current framework in
Section VI .
D. Notations
{0, 1}N×M denotes the space of N × M dimensional
matrices with entries that are either 0 or 1. Z+ is the set of
non-negative integers. For a set A, |A| denotes the cardinality
of A. x+ is the positive part of the real number x, that is,
x+ = max(x, 0). Vector inequalities are component-wise; that
is, for two 1 × n dimensional vectors u = (u1, · · · , un) and
v = (v1, · · · , vn), u ≤ v implies that ui ≤ vi , for i =
1, · · · , n. The transpose of a vector u is denoted by uT .
1{a≤b} denotes 1 if the inequality in the subscript is true and
0 otherwise. E denotes the expectation operator. For a random
variable/random vector θ, Eθ denotes that the expectation is
with respect to the probability distribution of θ.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a setup where an auctioneer has M goods and
N potential customers. M = {1, 2, · · · ,M} denotes the set
of goods and N = {1, 2, · · · , N} denotes the set of potential
customers. Customer i, i ∈ N , has a flexibility set φi ⊂ M
which represents the set of goods the customer is equally
interested in. Customer i can consume at most one good from
its flexibility set φi. We assume that the flexibility set of each
customer can be one of k nested sets. That is, we have k
nested subsets of the set of goods:
B1 ⊂ B2 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Bk ⊆M, (3)
and φi ∈ {B1,B2, · · · ,Bk} for every i ∈ N . If φi = Bj ,
we say that customer i’s flexibility level, denoted by bi, is j.
Customer i’s utility from receiving a good from φi is θi.
We assume that θi and bi are customer i’s private informa-
tion and are unknown to other users as well as the auctioneer.
We assume that (θi, bi), i ∈ N , are independent random pairs
taking values in the product sets [θmini , θ
max
i ]×{1, 2, . . . , k}
1,
1θmini is assumed to be non-negative.
4i ∈ N , respectively. The probability distributions2 fi of
(θi, bi), i ∈ N , are assumed to be common knowledge. We
define θ := (θ1, θ2, · · · , θN ) and b := (b1, b2, · · · , bN) as
the customers’ valuations profile and flexibility levels profile,
respectively. f(θ, b) is the joint probability distribution of
(θ, b). Let Θi := [θ
min
i , θ
max
i ] and Θ :=
N∏
i=1
Θi. The pair
(θi, bi) is referred to as customer i’s type.
An allocation of the goods among the customers can be
described by an N ×M dimensional matrix A with the entry
A(i, j) = 1 if customer i gets good j and A(i, j) = 0
otherwise. The matrix A is called an allocation matrix. We
assume that the goods are indexed such that the first |Bl| goods
belong to Bl, for l = 1, . . . , k.
We require that each of the M available goods be allocated
to at most one customer and that each customer receives at
most one good. This implies that
N∑
i=1
A(i, j) ≤ 1 , ∀j and
M∑
j=1
A(i, j) ≤ 1 , ∀i. A binary matrix A that satisfies these
two constraints is called a feasible allocation matrix. Let S ⊂
{0, 1}N×M denote the set of all feasible allocation matrices.
That is,
S :=
{
A ∈ {0, 1}N×M |
N∑
i=1
A(i, j) ≤ 1 ,
∀j ∈M ,
M∑
j=1
A(i, j) ≤ 1 , ∀i ∈ N
}
.
(4)
Given an allocation matrix A and a payment ti charged to
customer i, the net utility for this customer is
ui(θi, bi,A, ti) = θi
( ∑
j∈Bbi
A(i, j)
)
− ti. (5)
A. The Mechanism
We consider direct mechanisms where, for each i ∈ N ,
customer i reports a valuation from the set Θi and a flexibility
level from the set {1, 2, · · · , k} to the auctioneer. Customers
can misreport their valuations as well as their flexibility
levels. A mechanism consists of an allocation rule q and a
payment rule t. The allocation rule q is a mapping from the
type profile space Θ × {1, 2, · · · , k}N to the set of feasible
allocation matrices S. The payment rule t is a mapping from
Θ × {1, 2, · · · , k}N to RN with the ith component ti being
the payment charged to customer i.
Consider a mechanism (q, t) and suppose customers report
valuations r := (r1, . . . , rN ) and flexibility levels c :=
(c1, . . . , cN )
3. The mechanism then results in an allocation
matrix q(r, c) and payments t(r, c). Let a(bi) be a 1 × M
dimensional vector whose first |Bbi | entries are 1 and the rest
are 0. In other words, the j entry of a(bi) is given as
aj(bi) =
{
1 if 1 ≤ j ≤ |Bbi |
0 otherwise
. (6)
2We assume that fi(θi, bi) > 0, for all (θi, bi) ∈ [θmini , θ
max
i ] ×
{1, 2, . . . , k},∀i ∈ N .
3Customers may not report their valuations and/or flexibility levels truth-
fully, so ri and ci may be different from θi and bi, respectively.
Customer i’s utility function can then be written in terms
of its true valuation θi, true flexibility level bi, the reported
valuations r and the reported flexibility levels c as
ui(θi, r, bi, c) = θi a(bi) q
T
i (r, c)− ti(r, c), (7)
where qi(r, c) is the i
th row of the allocation matrix q(r, c).
B. Incentive Compatibility and Individual Rationality
The auctioneer’s objective is to find a mechanism that
maximizes its expected revenue while satisfying Bayesian
Incentive Compatibility and Individual Rationality constraints.
We describe these constraints below.
In a Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) mechanism, truth-
ful reporting of private information (valuations and flexibil-
ity levels in our setup) constitutes an equilibrium of the
Bayesian game induced by the mechanism. In other words,
each customer would prefer to report its true valuation and
flexibility level provided that all other customers have adopted
truth-telling strategy. Bayesian incentive compatibility can be
described by the following constraint:
Eθ
−i,b−i
[
θi a(bi) q
T
i (θ, b)− ti(θ, b)
]
≥
Eθ
−i,b−i
[
θi a(bi) q
T
i (ri, θ−i, ci, b−i)− ti(ri, θ−i, ci, b−i)
]
,
∀θi, ri ∈ Θi , ci, bi ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k} , ∀i ∈ N .
(8)
(8) states that the expected utility of customer i with type
(θi, bi) if it reports its type truthfully is greater than or equal
to its utility if it reports some other type (ri, ci).
Individual Rationality (IR) constraint implies that each
customer’s expected utility at the truthful reporting equilibrium
is non-negative. This can be expressed as:
Eθ
−i,b−i
[
θi a(bi) q
T
i (θ, b)− ti(θ, b)
]
≥ 0 ,
∀θi ∈ Θi , bi ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k} , ∀i ∈ N .
(9)
The expected revenue under a BIC and IR mechanism is
Eθ,b
{ N∑
i=1
ti(θ, b)
}
when all customers adopt the truthful strat-
egy. The auction design problem can now be formulated as
max
(q,t)
Eθ,b
{ N∑
i=1
ti(θ, b)
}
, subject to (8), (9).
C. Key Assumptions
We make two assumptions for the auction design problem.
Firstly, we assume that the allocation rule q does not give a
customer any good that is outside its reported flexibility set.
This can be formalized as follows:
Assumption 1. We assume that for each i ∈ N , qi(r, c) can
have non-zero entries only in its first |Bci | positions. (Recall
that the first |Bci| positions of qi(·, ·) correspond to goods in
Bci .)
The above assumption simply means that the mechanism
respects the customers’ reported flexibility constraints. We fur-
ther assume that customers cannot over-report their flexibility
level:
Assumption 2. For each i ∈ N , customer i’s reported
flexibility level ci cannot exceed its true flexibility level bi.
5The above assumption can be justified by noting that
customers gain no utility from getting a good outside their true
flexibility set and may in fact suffer a significant disutility if
allocated a good outside their true flexibility set. For instance,
consider the example of rate-constrained energy delivery in
electricity markets that is discussed in Section I-A. While some
consumers may be able to tolerate variable rates of energy
delivery and are thus considered to be more flexible, other
(less flexible) consumers may need to receive energy at a
constant rate as their devices could be damaged otherwise. It is
thus reasonable to assume that in this case the consumers will
not report higher flexibility level as it could cause significant
disutility to them. More generally, customers may reasonably
restrict themselves to under-reporting or truthfully reporting
their flexibility level if goods outside their flexibility set may
be damaging or cause large disutility to them. Assumption 2
implies that the BIC constraint in (8) need not consider the
case of ci > bi.
D. Examples
1. Consider the case where N = {1, 2}, M = {1, 2}, that is,
there are two customers and two goods. Let B1 = {1} and
B2 = {1, 2}. Customer 1’s type is (θ1 = 1, b1 = 2) with
probability 1. Customer 2’s type (θ2, b2) is uniformly dis-
tributed over the set [0.5, 2]×{1, 2}. Consider a mechanism
for this case that operates as follows:
(i) Each customer reports a valuation and a flexibility
level.
(ii) If customer i has the highest valuation (assume that
ties are resolved randomly), the mechanism allocates
a good to customer i from its reported flexibility set
and charges it the second highest reported valuation.
(iii) The other customer is allocated a good from its
flexibility set if such a good is available and it is
charged a reserve price of 0.5.
Suppose that customer 1 reports its type truthfully and that
customer 2’s true type is (θ2 = 2, b2 = 2). If customer 2
also reports its type truthfully, it will obtain a good at a
price of 1 (the second highest reported valuation) resulting
in a net utility of 2 − 1 = 1. On the other hand, if it
misreports its type as (0.5, 2), it will obtain a good at a
price of 0.5 resulting in a net utility of 1.5.
2. Consider the same setup as above but with the following
mechanism:
(i) Each customer reports a valuation and a flexibility
level.
(ii) If customer i has the highest valuation (assume that
ties are resolved randomly), the mechanism allocates
a good to customer i from its reported flexibility set.
Customer i is charged the reported valuation of the
other customer if the two reported the same flexibility
level, otherwise it pays a reserve price of 0.5.
(iii) The other customer is allocated a good from its
flexibility set if such a good is available and it is
charged a reserve price of 0.5.
Suppose that customer 1 reports its type truthfully and that
customer 2’s true type is (θ2 = 2, b2 = 2). If customer 2
also reports its type truthfully, it will obtain a good at a
price of 1 resulting in a net utility of 2 − 1 = 1. On the
other hand, if it misreports its type as (2, 1), it will obtain
a good at a price of 0.5 resulting in a net utility of 1.5.
Thus, in both the examples above, the mechanism described
is not incentive compatible.
III. CHARACTERIZATION OF BIC AND IR MECHANISMS
Suppose all customers other than i report their valuations
and flexibility levels truthfully. We can then define customer i’s
expected allocation and payment under the mechanism (q, t)
when it reports ri ∈ Θi , ci ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k} as:
Qi(ri, ci) := Eθ
−i,b−i
[
qi(ri, θ−i, ci, b−i)
]
, (10)
Ti(ri, ci) := Eθ
−i,b−i
[
ti(ri, θ−i, ci, b−i)
]
. (11)
We can now rewrite equations (8) and (9) in terms of the
interim quantities defined in (10)-(11). The BIC constraint for
misreporting valuations and flexibility levels becomes:
θi a(bi) Q
T
i (θi, bi)− Ti(θi, bi) ≥
θi a(bi) Q
T
i (ri, ci)− Ti(ri, ci) ,
∀θi, ri ∈ Θi , ci ≤ bi , ci, bi ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k} , ∀i ∈ N .
(12)
The IR constraint is rewritten as:
θi a(bi) Q
T
i (θi, bi)− Ti(θi, bi) ≥ 0 ,
∀θi ∈ Θi , bi ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k} , ∀i ∈ N .
(13)
A. One-Dimensional Misreports
The BIC constraint in (12) captures all possible ways in
which a customer may misreport its private information. It
includes the following two special sub-classes of constraints:
1) BIC constraint for misreporting only valuation:
θi a(bi) Q
T
i (θi, bi)− Ti(θi, bi) ≥
θi a(bi) Q
T
i (ri, bi)− Ti(ri, bi) ,
∀θi, ri ∈ Θi , ∀bi ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k} , ∀i ∈ N .
(14)
2) BIC constraint for misreporting only flexibility level:
θi a(bi) Q
T
i (θi, bi)− Ti(θi, bi) ≥
θi a(bi) Q
T
i (θi, ci)− Ti(θi, ci) , (15)
∀θi ∈ Θi , ci ≤ bi , ci, bi ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k} , ∀i ∈ N .
The following result relates the above constraints for “one-
dimensional” misreports to the general BIC constraint in (12).
Lemma 1. The BIC constraint for misreporting both valu-
ation and flexibility level implies and is implied by the BIC
constraints for misreporting only valuation and misreporting
only flexibility level. That is, (12) holds if and only if (14) and
(15) hold.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 1 allows us to replace the general BIC constraint for
two-dimensional misreports by the simpler one-dimensional
BIC constraints given in (14) and (15). The auction design
problem now becomes:
max
(q,t)
Eθ,b
{ N∑
i=1
ti(θ, b)
}
, subject to (13), (14), (15).
6B. Alternative Characterization of (13), (14), (15)
We will now derive alternative characterizations of the
constraints (13), (14), (15) that will be helpful for finding the
optimal mechanism.
Lemma 2. A mechanism (q, t) satisfies the BIC constraint for
misreporting only valuation (as given in (14)) if and only if
for all i ∈ N , a(bi)QTi (ri, bi) is non-decreasing in ri for all
bi and
Ti(ri, bi)
= Ki(bi) + ria(bi)Q
T
i (ri, bi)− a(bi)
ri∫
θmin
i
QTi (s, bi) ds, (16)
for all ri, bi.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Lemma 3. Suppose the mechanism (q, t) satisfies the BIC
constraint for misreporting only valuation (as given in (14)).
Then, it satisfies the IR constraint (13) if and only if for all bi
θmini a(bi) Q
T
i (θ
min
i , bi)− Ti(θ
min
i , bi) ≥ 0. (17)
Proof. Clearly (13) implies (17). The converse follows from
Lemma 2 by noting that
Ki(bi) = Ti(θ
min
i , bi)− θ
min
i a(bi)Q
T
i (θ
min
i , bi),
and that the right hand side above is non-positive due to (17).
Using the above two lemmas, we derive a sufficient con-
dition for the mechanism to satisfy the BIC constraint for
misreporting only flexibility level.
Lemma 4. Suppose the mechanism (q, t) is individually
rational and satisfies the BIC constraint for misreporting
only valuation (as given in (14)). Then the mechanism (q, t)
satisfies the BIC constraint for misreporting only flexibility
level if the following are true:
(i) a(ci) Q
T
i (θi, ci) is non-decreasing in ci , ∀θi ∈ Θi, ∀i ∈
N , and
(ii) Ti(θ
min
i , ci) = 0 , ∀ci ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k} , ∀i ∈ N .
Proof. See Appendix C.
IV. REVENUE MAXIMIZING MECHANISM
We can now use the results of Section III to simplify the
objective of the auction design problem. We define
wi(θi, bi) :=
(
θi −
1− Fi(θi|bi)
fi(θi|bi)
)
, (18)
where fi(θi|bi) is the conditional probability density function
of customer i’s valuation conditioned on its flexibility level
bi and Fi(θi|bi) is the corresponding cumulative distribution
function. wi(θi, bi) is referred to as customer i’s virtual type
or virtual valuation in economics terminology [27].
Lemma 5. Suppose (q, t) is a BIC and IR mechanism for
which (i) Ki(bi) = 0 for all i and bi
4 and (ii) q is a solution
to the following functional optimization problem
max
q
∑
b
∫
θ
N∑
i=1
[
a(bi) q
T
i (θ, b)wi(θi, bi)
]
f(θ, b)dθ. (19)
Then (q, t) is an optimal mechanism.
Proof. See Appendix D.
In order to simplify the maximization problem in (19) we
assume that the virtual types
(
θi −
1−Fi(θi|bi)
fi(θi|bi)
)
are non-
decreasing in θi and bi. Such a condition holds if
fi(θi|bi)
1−Fi(θi|bi)
is non-decreasing in θi and bi.
Generalized Monotone Hazard Rate Condition: The type
(θi, bi) is said to be partially ordered above (θ
′
i, b
′
i), and this
relation denoted by (θi, bi)  (θ
′
i, b
′
i), if θi ≥ θ
′
i and bi ≥
b′i. The distribution fi(·, ·) satisfies the generalized monotone
hazard rate condition if:
(θi, bi)  (θ
′
i, b
′
i) =⇒
fi(θi|bi)
1− Fi(θi|bi)
≥
fi(θ
′
i|b
′
i)
1− Fi(θ′i|b
′
i)
; (20)
Further, bi > b
′
i and θi ≥ θ
′
i imply
fi(θi|bi)
1− Fi(θi|bi)
>
fi(θ
′
i|b
′
i)
1− Fi(θ′i|b
′
i)
. (21)
Assumption 3. We assume that the probability density func-
tions fi(·, ·) satisfy the generalized monotone hazard rate
condition for all i ∈ N .
Remark 3. The above condition can be viewed as a gener-
alization of the increasing hazard rate condition [27, Chap-
ter 2] and is similar to the condition about monotonicity
of virtual valuations described in [28] for multidimensional
private types. To get further insights into the implications
of Assumption 3, consider two possible types of customer i
with flexibility levels bC ≥ bD. Let XC and XD be random
variables that are distributed according to the corresponding
conditional probability density functions fi(.|bC) and fi(.|bD)
respectively. For a realization α of XC , XD, Assumption 3
implies:
fi(α|bC)
1− Fi(α|bC)
≥
fi(α|bD)
1− Fi(α|bD)
. (22)
In the language of Shaked and Shanthikumar [29, Section
1.B.1], this means that XC is smaller than XD in the
hazard rate order (denoted by XC ≤hr XD) . According to
Theorem 1.B.1. in [29], it can then be concluded that XD
stochastically dominates XC in the first order (denoted by
XC ≤st XD). Thus one can roughly say that less flexible
consumers are expected to have higher valuations than more
flexible consumers.
Assumption 4. We assume that wi(θ
min
i , bi) < 0 , ∀bi ∈
{1, 2, · · · , k} , ∀i ∈ N .
Remark 4. Two examples of families of probability distribu-
tions fi(θi|bi) that satisfy Assumption 4 are:
4 Ki(bi) appears in Lemma 2.
7• Let θmini = 0. Then any probability density function g(·)
on [θmini , θ
max
i ] such that g(0) > 0 satisfies Assumption
4.
• A uniform distribution g(θi) =
1
|θmax
i
−θmin
i
|
, θi ∈
[θmini , θ
max
i ] with θ
min
i < |θ
max
i − θ
min
i | satisfies As-
sumption 4.
The following theorem characterizes the optimal mechanism
under the above assumptions.
Theorem 1. Consider the allocation and tax functions (q∗, t∗)
defined below
q∗(θ, b) ∈ argmax
A∈S
N∑
i=1
(
a(bi)A
T
i
)
wi(θi, bi) , (23)
where Ai is the ith row of matrix A;
t∗i (θ, b) := θi a(bi) q
∗T
i (θ, b)− a(bi)
θi∫
θmin
i
q∗Ti (s, θ−i, b) ds.
(24)
Then, under Assumptions 1-4, (q∗, t∗) is a revenue-maximizing
Bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational mech-
anism.
Proof. See Appendix E.
The optimal allocation matrix q∗(θ, b) given in (23) is the
solution of an integer program and hence computationally
hard to obtain. Moreover, each type profile (θ, b) ∈ Θ ×
{1, 2, · · · , k}N requires the solution of a different integer
program. Similarly, the characterization of payments given by
(24) is not very useful from a computational viewpoint as it
requires the solution of a continuum of integer programs. In
the next section, we leverage the nested structure imposed on
customers’ flexibility sets to simplify the optimal mechanism.
V. A CANDIDATE REVENUE MAXIMIZING MECHANISM
Based on their true flexibility sets, we can divide the cus-
tomers into k classes: Cl is the set of customers with flexibility
set Bl. Clearly, N =
k⋃
i=1
Ci and for i 6= j, Ci ∩ Cj = ∅. We
define
nl := |Cl|, l = 1, . . . , k,
ml := |Bl \ Bl−1|, l = 2, . . . , k, m1 := |B1|.
(25)
We also define the vectors n and m as
n := (n1, n2, · · · , nk) , m := (m1,m2, · · · ,mk). (26)
The vector n is referred to as the demand profile and the vector
m is referred to as the supply profile.
A. Supply Adequacy Problem
Before describing the optimal mechanism, we will need to
answer two questions:
1) Given a supply profile m and a demand profile n, can
the available goods be used to satisfy all customers? In
other words, does there exist an allocation matrix A ∈
{0, 1}N×M such that
∑
j∈φi
A(i, j) = 1, ∀ i ∈ N ,
N∑
i=1
A(i, j) ≤ 1, ∀ j ∈ M.
(27)
The above conditions on A ensure that each customer
gets a good from its flexibility set and that a good is
not allocated to multiple customers. If such an allocation
matrix exists, we say that the supply profilem is adequate
for the demand profile n.
2) If the supply profile m is not adequate for the demand
profile n, we have to remove some customers from
the demand profile to achieve adequacy. What is the
minimum number of customers that must be removed to
achieve adequacy?
Borrowing ideas from [30], we provide answers to the above
questions in Lemmas 6 and 7 below.
Lemma 6. We say that n ≺w m if the following k inequalities
hold:
l∑
i=1
ni ≤
l∑
i=1
mi, l = 1, 2, · · · , k. (28)
(a) The supply profile m is adequate for the demand profile
n if and only if n ≺w m. (b) If the supply profile is adequate
for the demand profile, a feasible allocation is obtained as
follows: Arrange customers in order of increasing flexibility
level; then the ith customer in this order gets the ith good.
Proof. The proof is straightforward and therefore omitted due
to space limitations. For part (b), recall that the goods are
indexed such that the first |Bl| goods belong to Bl, for l =
1, . . . , k.
If the supply profile m is not adequate, we have to remove
some customers from the demand profile. Consider a demand
profile n˜ ≤ n obtained by removing some customers. This new
demand profile will result in adequacy if and only if n˜ ≺w
m. Thus, the minimum number of customers to be removed
to achieve adequacy is given by the following optimization
problem:
min
n˜
k∑
i=1
(ni − n˜i) , subject to n˜ ≺w m , n˜ ≤ n. (29)
n˜ in the above optimization problem is a vector of non-negative
integers. The above integer program has a simple solution
described in the following lemma.
Lemma 7. Define r∗1 := (n1 − m1)
+. For 2 ≤ j ≤ k,
recursively define r∗j as the solution of the following one-
dimensional integer program:
r∗j := argmin
rj∈Z+
rj
subject to
j−1∑
l=1
(nl − r
∗
l ) + (nj − rj) ≤
j∑
l=1
ml .
(30)
Equivalently, r∗j :=
( j∑
l=1
(nl −ml) −
j−1∑
l=1
r∗l
)+
. Then, (i) for
j = 1, . . . , k, at least
∑j
i=1 r
∗
i customers must be removed
from the first j classes to satisfy the inequalities (28) of Lemma
86; (ii)
∑k
i=1 r
∗
i is the minimum value of the integer program
in (29).
Proof. See Appendix F.
B. Optimal Allocation
We can now use the results of Section V-A to find the
optimal allocation for a given type profile (θ, b). Recall from
Theorem 1 that the optimal allocation is given as
q∗(θ, b) ∈ argmax
A∈S
N∑
i=1
(
a(bi)A
T
i
)
wi(θi, bi).
We describe the optimal allocation in the following steps:
1) Firstly, any customer l with wl(θl, bl) ≤ 0 is immediately
removed from consideration (that is, it is not allocated
any good). Since virtual valuation is a non-decreasing
function of true valuation, wl(θl, bl) ≤ 0 if and only
if θl ≤ θ
res
l,bl
, where θresl,bl is a threshold based on the
probability distribution of θl conditioned on the flexibility
level bl. This threshold is called the reserve price for
customer l with flexibility level bl.
For each class of customers, we define the subset of
customers who have positive virtual valuations:
C+i := {l ∈ Ci : wl(θl, i) > 0}. (31)
Let n+i = |C
+
i |. Define r
∗
1 , . . . , r
∗
k as in Lemma 7 by
replacing ni with n
+
i for all i.
2) Let L1 := C
+
1 . From L1, r
∗
1 customers with the lowest
virtual valuations are removed from consideration5. The
set of remaining customers in L1 is denoted by N1.
3) We now proceed iteratively: For 2 ≤ i ≤ k, given
the set Ni−1, define Li := Ni−1
⋃
C+i . Remove r
∗
i
customers with lowest virtual valuations from Li. The
set of remaining customers in Li is now defined as Ni.
4) After the kth iteration, all customers in Nk are allocated
a good from their respective flexibility sets.
The iterative procedure described above is outlined in Al-
gorithm 1.
The optimality of the above allocation can be intuitively
explained as follows: Firstly, it is clear that an optimal
allocation should not give any goods to customers with non-
positive virtual valuations. Among the remaining customers
of class C1, at least r∗1 customers cannot be served (see
Lemma 7 with ni replaced by n
+
i for all i). It is easy to
see that the r∗1 customers with the lowest virtual valuations
should be removed. This argument can be used iteratively. At
the ith iteration, at least r∗i additional customers need to be
removed from the first i classes otherwise the ith adequacy
inequality would be violated. An optimal allocation should
remove r∗i customers with lowest virtual valuations. After the
kth iteration, exactly
∑k
i=1 r
∗
i customers have been removed
and the remaining customers’ demand profile satisfies all the
adequacy inequalities.
The above optimal allocation procedure can also be de-
scribed using thresholds. Define
5Ties are resolved randomly. For continuous valuations, ties happen with
zero probability and therefore the allocation rule for ties does not affect
expected revenue.
wthri := (r
∗
i )
th lowest virtual valuation in Li, i = 1, 2, · · · , k.
(32)
(If r∗i = 0, w
thr
i = 0.)
Then, at iteration i, customers that have virtual valuations
less than or equal to wthri will be removed from the set Li.
Under the optimal allocation, customer l in class Ci gets a
Algorithm 1 Pseudocode for Computing the Optimal Alloca-
tion
1: Remove all consumers with wl(θl, bl) ≤ 0.
2: Define C+i := {l ∈ Ci : wl(θl, i) > 0}, and let n
+
i = |C
+
i |
for i = 1, 2, · · · , k.
3: Compute r∗1 , · · · , r
∗
k through:
r∗j =
( j∑
l=1
(n+l −ml)−
j−1∑
l=1
r∗l
)+
, j = 1, 2, · · · , k.
4: Define N0 := ∅.
5: for each i = 1, 2, · · · , k do:
6: Given the set Ni−1, define Li := Ni−1 ∪ C
+
i
7: Define wthri := (r
∗
i )
th lowest virtual valuation in Li
8: Define Ni := {l ∈ Li : wl(θl, bl) > w
thr
i }
9: Keep the consumers in Ni, remove the ones in Li \Ni
10: i←− i+ 1
11: All customers in Nk are allocated goods in order of
increasing flexibility level (as per Lemma 6).
desired good if its virtual valuation exceeds 0 and thresholds
wthri , w
thr
i+1, · · · , w
thr
k . Let us define
θthrl,i =
{
x : wl(x, i) = max{0, w
thr
i , w
thr
i+1, · · · , w
thr
k }
}
.
(33)
Because of the monotonicity of virtual valuation as a function
of true valuation, customer l in class Ci gets a good if θl >
θthrl,i . Thus,
a(i)q∗Tl (θ, b) =
{
1 if θl > θ
thr
l,i
0 otherwise
,
∀l ∈ Ci, ∀i = 1, 2, · · · , k.
(34)
C. Payment Functions
We can now use the optimal allocation rule described in
section V-B to simplify customers’ payment functions. From
(24) the optimal payment function for customer l in flexibility
class Ci has the following form:
t∗l (θ, b) = θla(i)q
∗T
l (θ, b)− a(i)
θl∫
θmin
l
q∗Tl (s, θ−l, b) ds. (35)
Using the definition of a(i)q∗Tl (θ, b) given in (34), tl(θ, b) can
be simplified as:
1) If θl > θ
thr
l,i ,
t∗l (θ, b) = θl −
θthrl,i∫
θmin
l
a(i)q∗Tl (s, θ−l, b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
ds
−
θl∫
θthr
l,i
a(i)q∗Tl (s, θ−l, b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
ds = θthrl,i .
(36)
92) If θl ≤ θthrl,i , t∗l (θ, b) = 0. (37)
The optimal allocation and payments can thus be com-
puted through the straightforward threshold-based procedure
constructed in Sections V-B and V-C. By using the nested
structure of the flexibility sets, this procedure obviates the need
to solve the computationally hard integer program formulated
in Theorem 1.
Remark 5. It should be noted that equations (34)-(37) imply
that the mechanism (q∗, t∗) proposed in sections V-B and
V-C is ex post individually rational, that is, at the truthful
equilibrium the mechanism guarantees that each consumer
gets non-negative utility for every realization of consumers’
types. In particular, under (q∗, t∗) a consumer who receives
no good does not pay anything.
D. Computational Complexity of the Algorithm
To get a better idea of the computational complexity of the
solution approach developed in Sections V-B and V-C, we take
a closer look at the key steps.
The allocation procedure requires the recursive evaluation
of the quantities r∗1 , · · · , r
∗
k as per the closed-form solutions
given in step 3 of Algorithm 1. As is evident from these
equations, computation of r∗1 , · · · , r
∗
k is straightforward and
needs nothing more than addition, subtraction and comparison
with 0.
Once these quantities are obtained, the allocation rule is
given by an iterative procedure that consists of k iterations.
At each iteration the following steps are taken:
1) Sort the virtual valuations in the set Li. (sorting)
2) Find the r∗i th lowest virtual valuation in Li and set w
thr
i
equal to that value. (counting).
3) Remove from Li consumers with virtual valuations less
than or equal to wthri and keep the remaining ones in the
new set Ni. (deletion)
4) Move to iteration i+ 1.
As can be seen from the above steps, the only real computation
involved in each iteration is sorting6 which is known to be
computationally efficient.
The allocation and payment procedure does require comput-
ing virtual valuations from the reported types and using the
inverse mapping7 w−1l (·, i) : [w
min
l,i , w
max
l,i ] −→ Θl to find the
thresholds θthrl,i in (33). However, we believe these mappings
can be pre-computed with appropriate discretization and stored
in a lookup table to be used when needed. The necessity of
computing virtual valuations from types and vice versa is a
common feature of many mechanism design problems and not
unique to our auction.
Remark 6. Suppose that θl and bl are independent random
variables for all l ∈ N . In this case the virtual valuation for
customer l will take the following form
wl(θl) = θl −
1− Fl(θl)
fl(θl)
, ∀l ∈ N , (38)
6Comparison-based sorting algorithms have the worst-case complexity of
O(n logn) on n inputs [31, Part II].
7wmin
l,i
= wl(θ
min
l
, i) and wmax
l,i
= wl(θ
max
l
, i).
If we further assume that for all l ∈ N , θl is distributed over
the set [θmin, θmax] according to the same probability density
function f , then the thresholds θthrl,i in (33) do not depend on
l:
θthri =
{
x : w(x) = max{0, wthri , w
thr
i+1, · · · , w
thr
k }
}
. (39)
Moreover, we have θthr1 ≥ θ
thr
2 · · · ≥ θ
thr
k . The allocation and
payment functions can be simplified as follows: Customer l in
class Ci gets a good if θl > θthri and its payment simplifies
to: θthri 1{θl>θthri }
. It is evident in this case that more flexible
customers pay less for the good than less flexible customers.
Remark 7. Suppose the probability distributions for cus-
tomers’ types are such that the flexibility levels are degenerate
random variables. This essentially implies that the customers’
flexibility sets are common knowledge. If we further assume
that customers’ valuations given their flexibility level are
identically distributed, then the same observation as in Remark
6 follows: Customer l in class Ci gets a good if θl > θthri and
its payment simplifies to: θthri 1{θl>θthri }
.
VI. CONCLUSION
We studied the problem of designing revenue-maximizing
auctions for allocating multiple goods to flexible customers.
In our model, each customer is interested in a subset of
goods known as its flexibility set and wants to consume
one good from this set. A customer’s flexibility set and its
utility from consuming a good from its flexibility set are its
private information. We characterized the allocation rule for
an incentive compatible, individually rational and revenue-
maximizing auction in terms of solutions to integer programs.
The corresponding payment rule was described by an integral
equation. We then leveraged the nestedness of flexibility sets
to simplify the optimal auction and provided a complete
characterization of allocations and payments in terms of simple
thresholds.
A possible extension of our framework is the case where
customers may demand more than one good from their
flexibility sets. It would also be interesting to study this
auction problem under dynamic settings where the set of
customers and/or goods can change over time. In such a setting
customers may have richer private information that includes
their valuation, flexibility sets as well as their temporal pres-
ence information. Moreover, dynamic models can incorporate
supply uncertainties to capture scenarios where the seller relies
on uncertain and time-varying resources (such as renewable
energy) to serve its customers. The auction mechanism then
needs to make sequential decisions based on information
revealed at or before the current time. Investigating these
dynamic mechanism design problems will be a key task for
future research.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Clearly (12) implies (14) and (15). To prove the converse,
consider flexibility levels ci and bi with ci ≤ bi. From (15),
we have
θi a(bi) Q
T
i (θi, bi)− Ti(θi, bi)
≥ θi a(bi) Q
T
i (θi, ci)− Ti(θi, ci).
(40)
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Consider θi, ri ∈ Θi. From (14) we have
θi a(ci) Q
T
i (θi, ci)− Ti(θi, ci)
≥ θi a(ci) Q
T
i (ri, ci)− Ti(ri, ci).
(41)
Adding the inequalities in (40) and (41) we obtain:
θi a(bi) Q
T
i (θi, bi)− Ti(θi, bi) + θi a(ci) Q
T
i (θi, ci) ≥
θi a(ci) Q
T
i (ri, ci)− Ti(ri, ci) + θi a(bi) Q
T
i (θi, ci).
(42)
Because of Assumption 1 we have a(ci)Q
T
i (θi, ci) =
a(bi)Q
T
i (θi, ci) and a(ci)Q
T
i (ri, ci) = a(bi) Q
T
i (ri, ci). (42)
can then be written as
θi a(bi) Q
T
i (θi, bi)− Ti(θi, bi) ≥
θi a(bi) Q
T
i (ri, ci)− Ti(ri, ci),
(43)
which is the two-dimensional BIC constraint of (12). This
concludes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Sufficiency: Suppose a(bi)Q
T (ri, bi) is non-decreasing in
ri and customer i’s expected payment is of the form given in
(16). Suppose customer i’s true type is (θi, bi) and it reports
(ri, bi). Its expected utility is:
Ui(θi, ri, bi, bi) = θia(bi)Q
T
i (ri, bi)− Ti(ri, bi). (44)
We can then use (16) to rewrite customer i’s expected utility
as:
Ui(θi, ri, bi, bi) = (θi − ri)a(bi)Q
T
i (ri, bi)
+ a(bi)
ri∫
θmin
i
QTi (s, bi)ds−Ki(bi).
(45)
We now need to show that Ui(θi, θi, bi, bi) ≥
Ui(θi, ri, bi, bi), θi, ri ∈ Θi, bi ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k}, to conclude
Bayesian incentive compatibility in valuation for customer i.
We use the form given in (16) to write
Ui(θi, θi, bi, bi)− Ui(θi, ri, bi, bi)
= a(bi)
θi∫
θmin
i
QTi (s, bi)ds− a(bi)
ri∫
θmin
i
QTi (s, bi)ds
+ (ri − θi)a(bi)Q
T
i (ri, bi)
= (ri − θi)a(bi)Q
T
i (ri, bi) + a(bi)
θi∫
ri
QTi (s, bi)ds
=
θi∫
ri
a(bi){Q
T
i (s, bi)−Q
T
i (ri, bi)}ds. (46)
It is straightforward to verify that because of a(bi)Q
T
i (ri, bi)
being non-decreasing in ri, the expression in (46) is non-
negative for both ri < θi and ri > θi. Hence
Ui(θi, θi, bi, bi) ≥ Ui(θi, ri, bi, bi) for θi, ri ∈ Θi, (47)
which establishes Bayesian incentive compatibility of the
mechanism (q, t) in valuation for customer i.
Necessity: Suppose (q, t) is Bayesian incentive compatible
in valuation. Consider two candidate valuations x, y ∈ Θi, x <
y that customer i might have. First, assume (x, bi) is customer
i’s true type. Then BIC in valuation implies
xa(bi)Q
T
i (x, bi)− Ti(x, bi) ≥ xa(bi)Q
T
i (y, bi)− Ti(y, bi).
(48)
Now, consider (y, bi) to be the true type. BIC in valuation
gives
ya(bi)Q
T
i (y, bi)− Ti(y, bi) ≥ ya(bi)Q
T
i (x, bi)− Ti(x, bi).
(49)
Adding (48) and (49) and simplifying gives
a(bi)Q
T
i (y, bi) ≥ a(bi)Q
T
i (x, bi). (50)
Therefore, a(bi)Q
T
i (ri, bi) is non-decreasing in ri.
Let us define Vi(θi, bi) as customer i’s expected utility when
its valuation is θi and its flexibility level is bi and it adopts
truth-telling strategy:
Vi(θi, bi) := Ui(θi, θi, bi, bi). (51)
Using Bayesian incentive compatibility in valuation (51) can
be written as
Vi(θi, bi) = max
ri∈Θi
Ui(θi, ri, bi, bi)
= max
ri∈Θi
θia(bi)Q
T
i (ri, bi)− Ti(ri, bi).
(52)
Using the integral form of the Envelope Theorem as stated
in Theorem 3.1 in [32, Chapter 3] and (52) it follows that
Vi(θi, bi) satisfies the following equation:
Vi(θi, bi) = Vi(θ
min
i , bi) +
θi∫
θmin
i
a(bi)Q
T
i (s, bi)ds. (53)
Using (51) and (44) in (53), it then follows that Ti(θi, bi)
satisfies the following equation:
Ti(θi, bi) = Ti(θ
min
i , bi)− θ
min
i a(bi)Q
T
i (θ
min
i , bi)
+ θia(bi)Q
T
i (θi, bi)− a(bi)
θi∫
θmin
i
QTi (s, bi)ds.
(54)
(54) establishes (16) with Ki(bi) = Ti(θ
min
i , bi) −
θmini a(bi)Q
T
i (θ
min
i , bi).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Suppose (q, t) is individually rational and Bayesian incen-
tive compatible in valuation and satisfies conditions (i) and (ii)
of Lemma 4. For a customer of true type (θi, bi) who reports
(θi, ci), ci ≤ bi consider
θia(bi)Q
T
i (θi, bi)−Ti(θi, bi)−
(
θia(bi)Q
T
i (θi, ci)− Ti(θi, ci)
)
.
(55)
Using (16) from Lemma 2 and the second condition of Lemma
4 for the two Ti(·, ·) terms in (55), we obtain:
θi∫
θmin
i
(a(bi) Q
T
i (s, bi)− a(ci) Q
T
i (s, ci))ds
+ θmini (a(bi) Q
T
i (θ
min
i , bi)− a(ci) Q
T
i (θ
min
i , ci)).
(56)
11
Since a(bi)Q
T
i (ri, bi) is assumed to be non-decreasing in bi,
the integral term as well as the term (a(bi) Q
T
i (θ
min
i , bi) −
a(ci) Q
T
i (θ
min
i , ci)) are non-negative. Thus, the expression in
(55) is non-negative and hence the BIC constraint in flexibility
level (equation (15)) is satisfied.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
The total expected revenue can be written as
Eθ,b
{ N∑
i=1
ti(θ, b)
}
=
N∑
i=1
Eθi,bi
[
Eθ
−i,b−i [ti(θi, θ−i, bi, b−i)]
]
=
N∑
i=1
Eθi,bi
[
Ti(θi, bi)
]
. (57)
For a mechanism that is individually rational and Bayesian
incentive compatible, we can use the result in Lemma 2 to plug
in the expression for Ti(θi, bi). After some simplifications we
obtain that
Eθi,bi
[
Ti(θi, bi)
]
= Ebi
[
Ki(bi)
]
+
∑
b
∫
θ
[
a(bi) q
T
i (θ, b)
(
θi −
1− Fi(θi|bi)
fi(θi|bi)
)]
f(θ, b)dθ.
(58)
We can now rewrite the auctioneer’s total expected revenue
in (57) as:
N∑
i=1
Eθi,bi
[
Ti(θi, bi)
]
=
N∑
i=1
Ebi
[
Ki(bi)
]
+
∑
b
∫
θ
N∑
i=1
[
a(bi) q
T
i (θ, b)wi(θi, bi)
]
f(θ, b)dθ.
(59)
The second term on the right hand side in (59) is completely
determined by the choice of the allocation rule q(·, ·). Also,
note that Lemmas 2 and 3 imply that Ki(bi) = Ti(θ
min
i , bi)−
θmini a(bi)Q
T
i (θ
min
i , bi) ≤ 0. Therefore, a BIC and IR mecha-
nism (q, t) that maximizes the second term on the right hand
side in (59) and ensures that Ki(bi) = 0 for all i and bi would
provide the largest expected revenue among all BIC and IR
mechanisms.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We first establish that the mechanism (q∗, t∗) is Bayesian
incentive compatible and individually rational. Based on the
results of Lemmas 1 - 4, it is sufficient to show the following:
(i) Customer i’s expected payment on reporting ri and ci,
T ∗i (ri, ci), satisfies (16),
(ii) T ∗i (θ
min
i , ci) = 0 , ∀ci ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k},
(iii) The expected allocation, a(ci)Q
∗T
i (ri, ci), is non-
decreasing in ri and ci.
By taking the expectation of t∗i (θ, b) over (θ−i, b−i) in (24),
it is easily established that the expected payment satisfies (16)
with Ki(bi) = 0. Furthermore, since Assumption 4 states that
wi(θ
min
i , bi) < 0, it follows that a(bi)q
∗T
i (θ
min
i , θ−i, b) = 0.
If this were not the case then, q∗ could not have achieved the
maximum in (23). Evaluating (24) at θmini then shows that
t∗i (θ
min
i , θ−i, b) = 0 which further implies that T
∗
i (θ
min
i , bi) =
0.
In order to establish monotonicity of a(ci)Q
∗T
i (ri, ci) in ri,
it is sufficient to argue that a(ci)q
T
i (ri, θ−i, ci, b−i) is non-
decreasing in ri. The proof is similar to the arguments in
chapters 2-3 of [27] and basically follows from the fact virtual
type wi(ri, ci) is non-decreasing in ri.
To establish monotonicity of a(ci)Q
∗T
i (ri, ci) in ci, it
suffices to show that for any two candidate flexibility levels
γ, λ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k}, γ < λ, we will have
a(γ)q∗Ti (θ, γ, b−i) ≤ a(λ)q
∗T
i (θ, λ, b−i), (60)
for all θ and b−i.
For the type profile (θ, γ, b−i), the maximum value of the
objective function in (23) is a(γ) q∗Ti (θ, γ, b−i)wi(θi, γ) +∑
j 6=i
a(bj) q
∗T
j (θ, γ, b−i) wj(θj , bj). Therefore, we must have
a(γ) q∗Ti (θ, γ, b−i)wi(θi, γ)
+
∑
j 6=i
a(bj) q
∗T
j (θ, γ, b−i) wj(θj , bj)
≥ a(γ) q∗Ti (θ, λ, b−i)wi(θi, γ)
+
∑
j 6=i
a(bj) q
∗T
j (θ, λ, b−i) wj(θj , bj).
(61)
Similarly, when the type profile is (θ, λ, b−i),
the maximum value of the objective func-
tion in (23) is a(λ) q∗Ti (θ, λ, b−i)wi(θi, λ) +∑
j 6=i
a(bj) q
∗T
j (θ, λ, b−i) wj(θj , bj). Therefore, we must
have
a(λ) q∗Ti (θ, λ, b−i)wi(θi, λ)
+
∑
j 6=i
a(bj) q
∗T
j (θ, λ, b−i) wj(θj , bj)
≥ a(λ) q∗Ti (θ, γ, b−i)wi(θi, λ)
+
∑
j 6=i
a(bj) q
∗T
j (θ, γ, b−i)wj(θj , bj).
(62)
Now, adding the two inequalities (61)-(62) gives
(wi(θi, λ)a(λ) − wi(θi, γ)a(γ)) q
∗T
i (θ, λ, b−i)
≥ (wi(θi, λ)a(λ)− wi(θi, γ)a(γ)) q
∗T
i (θ, γ, b−i).
(63)
Define:
z1 := (wi(θi, λ)a(λ) − wi(θi, γ)a(γ)) q
∗T
i (θ, λ, b−i),
z2 := (wi(θi, λ)a(λ) − wi(θi, γ)a(γ)) q
∗T
i (θ, γ, b−i).
(64)
(63) says that
z1 ≥ z2. (65)
Let us denote ωλ := wi(θi, λ) and ωγ := wi(θi, γ). From
the generalized monotone hazard rate condition (see (21)), we
know that ωλ > ωγ . From the definition of vector a(·) (see
(6)) and q∗ (see Assumption 1) and the fact that γ < λ, it is
easy to see that a(λ)q∗Ti (θ, λ, b−i) ≥ a(γ)q
∗T
i (θ, λ, b−i) and
a(λ)q∗Ti (θ, γ, b−i) = a(γ)q
∗T
i (θ, γ, b−i).
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Depending on the values of a(λ)q∗Ti (θ, λ, b−i),
a(γ)q∗Ti (θ, λ, b−i) and a(γ)q
∗T
i (θ, γ, b−i), z1 and z2
can take the following values:
z1 =


0 if a(λ)q∗Ti (θ, λ, b−i) = 0
ωλ − ωγ if a(γ)q∗Ti (θ, λ, b−i) = 1
ωλ if (a(λ)− a(γ)) q
∗T
i (θ, λ, b−i) = 1
,
(66)
z2 =
{
0 if a(γ)q∗Ti (θ, γ, b−i) = 0
ωλ − ωγ if a(γ)q∗Ti (θ, γ, b−i) = 1
. (67)
We can establish (60) as follows: The quantities on the
left and right hand sides in (60) are either 0 or 1. If
a(γ)q∗Ti (θ, γ, b−i) = 0, then (60) is trivially true. It remains
to be shown that when a(γ)q∗Ti (θ, γ, b−i) = 1 we also have
a(λ)q∗Ti (θ, λ, b−i) = 1. Suppose a(γ)q
∗T
i (θ, γ, b−i) = 1 but
a(λ)q∗Ti (θ, λ, b−i) = 0. This would imply that z2 = ωλ − ωγ
(which is positive) and z1 = 0; but then z1 < z2 which is a
contradiction of (65). This proves (60).
Finally, it is straightforward to see that the allocation
rule q∗(θ, b) which is defined in (23) as the maximizer of
the weighted sum
N∑
i=1
a(bi)q
T
i (θ, b)wi(θi, bi), will naturally
maximize the second term on the right hand side of (59).
Moreover, as argued above, Ki(bi) = 0 for all i and bi
under (q∗, t∗). Hence, the mechanism (q∗, t∗) is a revenue-
maximizing Bayesian incentive compatible and individually
rational mechanism.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF LEMMA 7
Consider any feasible solution of the optimization problem
in (29) denoted as (n˜1, n˜2, · · · , n˜k). We will now show
inductively that:
i∑
j=1
(nj − n˜j) ≥
i∑
j=1
r∗j , ∀ i = 1, 2, · · · , k. (68)
For i = 1 we have:
n˜1 ≤ n1 , n˜1 ≤ m1 =⇒ n˜1 ≤ min{n1,m1}. (69)
From this we can write:
n1 − n˜1 ≥ n1 −min{n1,m1} = (n1 −m1)
+ = r∗1 . (70)
Now suppose the inequality in (68) holds for i. We now
want to prove it also holds for i + 1. Let us consider two
cases based on the possible values of r∗i+1: 1) r
∗
i+1 = 0 and
2) r∗i+1 > 0. When r
∗
i+1 = 0, it follows directly from the
induction hypothesis for i in (68) that:
i+1∑
j=1
(nj − n˜j) ≥
i+1∑
j=1
r∗j . (71)
Now consider the case when r∗i+1 > 0. In this case, from the
optimization constraint in (30) it can be verified that r∗i+1 =
ni+1 +
i∑
j=1
(nj − r∗j )−
i+1∑
j=1
mj ; hence:
i+1∑
j=1
(nj − r
∗
j ) =
i+1∑
j=1
mj , (72)
which implies
i+1∑
j=1
r∗j =
i+1∑
j=1
(nj −mj). (73)
From the optimization constraints in (29) we know that:
i+1∑
j=1
n˜j ≤
i+1∑
j=1
mj . (74)
Combining (73) and (74) we get:
i+1∑
j=1
(nj − n˜j) ≥
i+1∑
j=1
(nj −mj) =
i+1∑
j=1
r∗j . (75)
Thus the inequality in (68) holds for i+1 as well. Therefore
by induction we can conclude that:
l∑
j=1
(nj − n˜j) ≥
l∑
j=1
r∗j ,
for l = 1, . . . , k. Thus, at least
∑l
j=1 r
∗
j customers must be
removed from the first l classes to satisfy the inequalities in
(28) of Lemma 6.
To show that the
∑k
j=1 r
∗
j is minimum value of the integer
program in (29), consider the following procedure:
1) Let L1 := C1. From L1, r∗1 customers are removed. The
set of remaining customers in L1 is denoted by N1.
2) Proceed iteratively: For 2 ≤ i ≤ k, given the set Ni−1,
define Li := Ni−1
⋃
Ci. Remove r∗i customers from Li.
The set of remaining customers in Li is now defined as
Ni.
It can be verified that the above procedure removes exactly
k∑
j=1
r∗j customers and creates a demand profile n˜ that meets
the adequacy condition n˜ ≺w m.
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